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This article asks how the conflict of laws should approach couples’ property as a matter 
of first principles, by reference to the law of New Zealand. It argues that lawmakers 
should make full use of the pluralist potential of general conflict of laws methodology, 
engaging in an explicit evaluation of the many – often hidden – values that shape its 
rules. Based on such an evaluation, the article argues that the conflict of laws should 
strive to facilitate the effective dissolution of personal property relationships and 
recognise their personal and social ties to legal systems. An internationalist approach, 
displaying an openness to the exercise of jurisdiction and the application of foreign law, 
would serve to achieve these aims. 
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A.   Introduction   
When individuals enter into a personal relationship – such as marriage, a civil union or 
registered partnership, or a de facto relationship – the law must find a way of allocating the 
property that they own or acquire. It must determine whether the property remains separate or 
becomes jointly owned, how to divide up the property once the relationship has come to an end, 
and whether the relationship is of a kind that is covered by the rules so developed. Different 
legal systems approach these questions in different ways. In today’s globalised world, it is 
increasingly likely that couples will be caught between these different systems. Couples are 
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more likely to be of mixed nationality or geographic origin, to live in several countries over 
the course of their relationship, or to amass property in more than one jurisdiction. When such 
couples want to ascertain their respective entitlements to property, it is necessary to address 
the cross-border elements of their claims. Hence, such claims – claims relating to ‘couples’ 
property’ – are a core concern for any modern system of conflict of laws.1  
This paper asks how the conflict of laws should approach these claims as a matter of 
first principles.2 It does this by reference to the law of New Zealand, for two reasons. The first 
is that the New Zealand Law Commission is currently reviewing the effectiveness of the 
conflict of laws rules in the Property (Relationships) Act 1976,3 so a deeper inquiry into its 
rules is both necessary and timely. The second reason is that New Zealand, with a conflict of 
laws system that is unburdened by the goals of the EU project and still coming into its own 
after decades of reliance on English law, offers a comparative perspective that is particularly 
insightful. The New Zealand experience encourages us to ask searching questions of the 
conflict of laws as a discipline, and to reflect on the many different solutions that may be 
applied to couples’ property.   
The proposed ‘first principles’ approach is based on the general conflict of laws 
methodology applicable in New Zealand. Applying this methodology, and making use of its 
full pluralist potential, the paper argues that the New Zealand conflict of laws should adopt an 
‘internationalist’ approach to couples’ property. It should focus on the couple’s proprietary 
relationship (their ‘personal property relationship’), rather than the property, and recognise the 
relationship’s personal and social ties to foreign legal systems. New Zealand’s current conflict 
of laws rules on couples’ property, on the other hand, are unduly inward focused, giving too 
 
1 See R Schuz, ‘Choice of Law in Relation to Matrimonial Property in the 21st Century’ (2019) Journal of Private 
International Law (forthcoming). 
2 Cf ibid. 
3 Law Commission, Dividing Relationship Property – Time for Change? (NZLC IP41, 2017). 
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much scope to the law of the forum and, conversely, giving too little scope to the court’s 
subject-matter jurisdiction over foreign domiciliaries and foreign land.  
The paper is in four sections. Section B provides an overview of New Zealand’s current 
conflict of laws rules on couples’ property. Section C then takes a step back and asks what are 
the first principles that should apply in reforming the rules? Section D applies these principles 
to ask what New Zealand’s conflict of laws rules on couples’ property should look like?  
 
B.   The Property (Relationships) Act 1976 and its Conflict of Laws Rules    
New Zealand has what may be described as a deferred community regime for couples’ 
property.4 The Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (PRA) provides that property acquired in the 
course of a relationship, as well as the family home and chattels, are generally to be treated as 
‘relationship property’; and that, barring extraordinary circumstances, all relationship property 
is to be divided equally between the partners upon separation.5 This regime applies equally to 
couples in a marriage, civil union or de facto relationship, which sets it apart from many of the 
regimes applicable in other countries. 
New Zealand’s conflict of laws rules on couples’ property are largely codified in ss 7 and 
7A of the Act. The purpose of this Section is to analyse the rules (rather than critique them). It 
provides a brief overview of ss 7 and 7A (Pt 1), before turning to consider their scope of 
application (Pt 2) and whether there is residual subject-matter jurisdiction outside of the PRA 
(Pt 3).  
 
1.   Sections 7 and 7A in brief  
 
4 See A Angelo and W Atkin, ‘A Conceptual and Structural Overview of the Matrimonial Property Act 1976’ 
(1977) 7 New Zealand Universities Law Review 237. 
5 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 11.  
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The PRA relies on a distinction between movable and immovable property to limit its reach. 
Section 7 provides that the Act applies to immovable property situated in New Zealand, and to 
movable property situated in New Zealand or elsewhere provided one of the spouses or partners 
is domiciled in New Zealand.6 Thus, the Act excludes movable property where neither party is 
domiciled in New Zealand; and foreign immovables are excluded entirely from the regime.7 
The only exception to this is if the parties have conferred subject-matter jurisdiction on the 
New Zealand court by agreeing that the PRA is to be applicable.8 The courts have held that 
they may not even take account of immovables situated outside New Zealand when dividing 
up a couple’s property under the Act.9  
Section 7 is a unilateral choice of law rule, which means that it denotes the extent to 
which New Zealand law applies to cross-border claims. However, s 7A allows parties to 
contract out of s 7 by agreeing that foreign law is to be applicable.10  
 
 
6 Set out in full, s 7 provides: 
7 Application to movable or immovable property 
(1) This Act applies to immovable property that is situated in New Zealand. 
(2) This Act applies to movable property that is situated in New Zealand or elsewhere, if one of the 
spouses or partners is domiciled in New Zealand— 
(a) at the date of an application made under this Act; or 
(b) at the date of any agreement between the spouses or partners relating to the division of their 
property; or 
(c) at the date of his or her death. 
(3) Despite subsection (2), if any order under this Act is sought against a person who is neither 
domiciled nor resident in New Zealand, the court may decline to make an order in respect of any 
movable property that is situated outside New Zealand. 
7 Walker v Walker [1983] NZLR 560 (CA); Samarawickrema v Samarawickrema [1995] 1 NZLR 14 (CA). 
8 Section 7A(1). The section is not expressed to be subject to limitations. 
9 Samarawickrema v Samarawickrema [1995] 1 NZLR 14 (CA). However, the machinery provisions on post-
separation conduct may operate so as to provide compensation: Walker v Walker [1983] NZLR 560 (CA). 
10 Set out in full, s 7A provides: 
7A Application where spouses or partners agree 
(1) This Act applies in any case where the spouses or partners agree in writing that it is to apply. 
(2) Subject to subsections (1) and (3), this Act does not apply to any relationship property if— 
(a) the spouses or partners have agreed, before or at the time their marriage, civil union, or de 
facto relationship began, that the property law of a country other than New Zealand is to apply to 
that property; and 
(b) the agreement is in writing or is otherwise valid according to the law of that country. 
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if the court determines that the application of the law of the other 




2.   Scope of section 7   
Section 7 delimits exhaustively the cross-border application of the Act: the court need not 
characterise the issue in order to identify the rules of subject-matter jurisdiction and choice of 
law that, in turn, will determine whether the Act applies. It need not ask, for example, whether 
a claim brought by a New Zealand-domiciled wife in relation to the couple’s movables in 
England raises a proprietary or restitutionary issue, or whether it deals instead with the property 
consequences of marriage (and other personal relationships). Section 7 has already done the 
work. The Act applies to all claims falling within its material scope, provided the connecting 
factors in section 7 are satisfied.  
This also means that the Act applies even if the claim is pleaded as a matter of foreign 
law.11 In other words, it is not possible to circumvent section 7 and the PRA by pleading the 
case as, say, a constructive trust claim under English law (or, for that matter, New Zealand 
law12). The New Zealand-domiciled wife cannot rely on the English law of constructive trusts 
to claim an interest in movable property in England beneficially owned by her spouse: first, 
because section 7 provides that the Act applies to movable property if one of the parties is 
domiciled in New Zealand, and the wife is domiciled in New Zealand; and second, because the 
claim concerns ‘transactions between spouses or partners in respect of property’ and so falls 
within the material scope of the PRA regime.13   
 
3.   Residual subject-matter jurisdiction  
The PRA does not confer universal subject-matter jurisdiction – it confers jurisdiction over the 
heads of property specified in section 7(1) and 7(2). It is an open question whether the PRA 
excludes residual subject-matter jurisdiction under common law conflict of laws rules for 
 
11 The Act is not merely ‘self-limiting’: see L Collins (ed), Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 15th edn, 2014) [‘Dicey, Morris and Collins’] para 1-049.  
12 S 4. 
13 S 4.  
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claims that fall beyond its reach: claims relating to foreign immovables, and claims relating to 
movables where neither of the parties is domiciled in New Zealand, in circumstances where 
the parties have not agreed that the PRA is to be applicable.14  
For example, the PRA would not apply to the movable property of a couple from 
Germany who travel to New Zealand, spend a few years in the country without becoming 
domiciled, and accumulate significant assets during that period. It is unclear what would 
happen if they nevertheless ask the New Zealand court to determine their respective property 
rights outside of the PRA regime. Does section 7, by implication, exclude the court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction to determine a couples’ property claim by non-domiciliaries pursuant to 
laws other than the PRA? Or does section 7 leave intact residual common law rules of subject-
matter jurisdiction, so that the claim may be brought to the extent it satisfies those rules? 
The Act does not offer any obvious clues. Section 4 provides that the Act operates as a 
code, excluding claims in common law and equity.15 But this exclusion is confined to rules and 
presumptions relating to ‘transactions’ between the parties, which does not seem to capture 
conflict of laws rules;16 and section 7 simply states that the Act applies if the conditions in 
section 7 are met.  It is true that it is undesirable to maintain two sets of conflict of laws rules, 
requiring claimants to consult both the PRA and common law to determine whether the New 
Zealand court has jurisdiction.17 But it would be wrong to draw an inference that, by enacting 
section 7, Parliament intended to exclude the court’s residual subject-matter jurisdiction in 
circumstances where it may otherwise be the appropriate forum to hear the claim. In the 
absence of such an intention, the common law rules cannot be considered extinguished. Thus, 
the better view is that section 7 does not affect jurisdiction over, say, a German claim between 
 
14 See C McLachlan, ‘Matrimonial Property and the Conflict of Laws’ (1986) 12 New Zealand Universities Law 
Review 66. 
15 S 4; Burt v Yiannakis [2015] NZHC 1174, [2015] NZFLR 739 (HC). 
16 On the argument that s 4 also excludes common law conflict of laws rules, see McLachlan (supra n 14) 76. 
17 See further McLachlan (supra n 14) 77 (‘The common law conflicts rules could not be applied easily in the 
modern New Zealand statutory context’).  
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non-domiciled but resident spouses in relation to movable property, simply because it is the 
kind of claim that would have to be brought under the PRA if section 7 were applicable.  
If section 7 is not a rule of exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction, the question arises 
whether common law rules confer jurisdiction over foreign immovables (or whether 
jurisdiction is limited to movable property). This requires examination of the Moçambique rule, 
which has traditionally excluded subject-matter jurisdiction over claims relating to title in, or 
possession of, foreign land.18 More specifically, the issue is whether couples’ property claims 
fall within the in personam exception of the rule, which applies if the court is enforcing 
personal equities between the parties, such as contractual obligations relating to the transfer of 
foreign land. There is mixed authority on this issue,19 but in line with the general softening of 
the Moçambique rule,20 the better view may be that claims relating to couples’ property fall 
within the exception to the rule. Moreover, the rule is unlikely to apply where the parties have 
entered into a property agreement relating to foreign law.21  
Finally, it is important to note that a claim that satisfies residual common law rules of 
subject-matter jurisdiction may still, ultimately, be unavailable if the applicable choice of law 
rule points to New Zealand law being the governing law. That is because there seems to be no 
residual jurisdiction as a matter of New Zealand domestic law to determine couples’ property 
claims outside of the PRA regime. Section 4 provides that the Act operates as a code, excluding 
 
18 The British South Africa Co v The Companhia de Moçambique [1893] AC 602 (HL). 
19 Asher J in Burt v Yiannakis considered that relationship property matters did not ordinarily fall within this 
exception, taking a narrow view of the exception: Burt v Yiannakis [2015] NZHC 1174, [2015] NZFLR 739 (HC), 
[55]ff, [73], cf [46]-[47] (where his Honour considered that s 7 reflects the well-established principle of private 
international law that rights to foreign immovables ‘would fall for consideration under the lex situs’). Asher J’s 
reasoning does not sit well with Woolford’s analysis in Schumacher v Summergrove Estates Ltd [2013] NZHC 
1387, [17], where his Honour concluded that the Court had subject-matter jurisdiction to declare a constructive 
trust over foreign land (on appeal, the Court of Appeal did not consider this issue and proceeded on the assumption 
that there was subject-matter jurisdiction). Moreover, there is overseas common law authority that provides 
indirect support for the proposition that the exception applies in the couples’ property context: Murakami Takako 
v Wiryadi Louise Maria (No 2) [2009] 1 SLR 508 (CA), [36]; see also Murakami v Wiryadi [2006] NSWSC 1354, 
[51]. 
20 See Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth [2011] UKSC 39, [2012] 1 AC 208, [70]. 
21  See Law Commission (supra n 3) 790, citing David Goddard, ‘Relationship Property Disputes – the 




claims in common law and equity.22 So if common law choice of law rules were to point to 
New Zealand law being applicable, but section 7 excludes application of the PRA, the court 
appears to lack jurisdiction to entertain a claim based on common law rights or equity.23 Strictly 
speaking, this is not a conflicts matter at all but a matter of New Zealand substantive law.24  
 
C.   Going back to ‘first principles’ – a question of methodology    
The Law Commission’s review provides a good opportunity to ask whether New Zealand’s 
conflict of laws rules on couples’ property are still fit for purpose. Instead of identifying 
specific problems with the way the rules have operated, this paper proposes to examine the 
rules as a matter of first principles. The benefit of a ‘first principles’ approach is that it enables 
consideration of all the norms, aims, policies or principles – in short, the full suite of values – 
that should shape the rules. It forces us to confront existing assumptions behind the rules and 
provides a basis for comprehensive critique. 
 The purpose of this Section is to outline the parameters of the proposed ‘first principles’ 
approach. Such an examination should take place within the framework of the general conflict 
of laws, which provides a methodology for devising rules of subject-matter jurisdiction and 
choice of law (Pt 1). This methodology, in New Zealand’s modern system of conflict of laws, 
requires a value-based, contextual engagement with the rules (Pt 2).  
 
1.   Devising rules of subject-matter jurisdiction and choice of law 
 
22 Section 4; Burt v Yiannakis [2015] NZHC 1174, [2015] NZFLR 739 (HC). 
23 Cf Mosaed v Mosaed [1997] NZFLR 97 (CA) for the proposition that the PRA is not a complete code. 
24 In Burt v Yiannakis [2015] NZHC 1174, [2015] NZFLR 739 (HC), for example, Ms Burt claimed an equitable 
interest in immovable properties in London and submitted that, if an equitable interest in these properties fell 
outside of the scope of s 7, equitable relief could still be sought in its own right outside of the PRA regime (at 
[22]). Ms Burt apparently did not plead foreign law (ie English law) as being applicable to such a claim so her 
claim had to be considered under New Zealand law by default.  The High Court rejected the submission. It 
concluded that s 4, which provides that the PRA operates as a code, functioned as a jurisdictional bar to common 
law or equitable claims relating to foreign immovables. However the Court was not required to consider whether 
the position would have been different if Ms Burt’s claim was held to be governed by English law. 
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The conflict of laws serves a number of key functions in resolving cross-border disputes about 
couples’ property. Of particular relevance here are two of these functions: subject-matter 
jurisdiction and choice of law.  
The first, subject-matter jurisdiction, determines whether the court has adjudicatory 
jurisdiction over matters with foreign elements.25 Subject-matter jurisdiction may coincide 
with the scope of the law of the forum. For example, the New Zealand court’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction over the dissolution of marriage coincides with New Zealand’s exercise of 
prescriptive jurisdiction under the Family Proceedings Act 1980,26 because the court does not 
apply foreign law to questions of divorce.27 If New Zealand law (ie the Act) applies, the court 
has jurisdiction, and vice versa. In this paper, it will be necessary, therefore, to consider whether 
the New Zealand court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over couples’ property should be limited 
(for example, whether it should exclude certain types of property, or whether it should be 
coextensive with the scope of New Zealand law).   
Subject-matter jurisdiction is distinguishable from personal jurisdiction. A court does 
not have subject-matter jurisdiction over a matter simply because it has personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant. 28  Subject-matter jurisdiction, in a conflict of laws sense, is also 
distinguishable from subject-matter jurisdiction in a domestic sense. Thus, a specialised court 
or tribunal like the Family Court has ‘domestic’ subject-matter jurisdiction over proceedings 
relating to family matters, but this does not mean that the High Court’s international jurisdiction 
is similarly confined. For example, the Family Court’s jurisdiction over couples’ property 
matters is confined to the scope of the PRA, but this does not mean that the High Court would 
 
25 See A Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (Oxford University Press, 2013) 50; M Hook, ‘The statutist trap and subject-
matter jurisdiction’ (2017) 13 Journal of Private international Law 435.  
26 S 37(2). 
27 See Wilson v Wilson (1872) LR 2 P & D 435, 441-2; Le Mesurier v Le Mesurier [1895] AC 517, 540-1. 
28 FA Mann, ‘The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law’ (1964) 111 Recueil des Cours 1, 146. As to in 
personam claims and personal jurisdiction, see Dicey, Morris and Collins (supra n 11) Rule 29. 
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lack international subject-matter jurisdiction to determine a claim that falls outside the scope 
of the PRA.29  
If the court does have subject-matter jurisdiction, the second function of the conflict of 
laws is to identify the law applicable to the matter. Is the matter governed by the law of the 
forum, or is it subject to a choice of law rule that may lead to the application of foreign law (ie 
a “multilateral” choice of law rule)? If it is the latter, then what is the applicable connecting 
factor? The questions of subject-matter and choice of law are often closely interrelated where 
subject-matter jurisdiction coincides with the scope of the law of the forum.30 The second 
principal question in this paper, therefore, will be whether couples’ property should be 
governed exclusively by the law of New Zealand and, if foreign law is applicable in principle, 
what the relevant connecting factor(s) should be. 
 
2.  Conflicts methodology as a value-based inquiry   
Conflict of laws methodology provides for three consecutive steps to determine its rules on 
subject-matter jurisdiction and choice of law: the process of characterisation, the identification 
of subject-matter limitations, and the selection of appropriate connecting factors for the 
purposes of choice of law. In performing these steps, the conflict of laws balances a range of 
sometimes competing values.  
The first step – the process of characterisation – is crucial in shaping the nature of the 
inquiry. Characterisation provides the conflict of laws with a language for transcending the 
bounds of the domestic, in order to identify the best conflict of laws rules for issues that are not 
confined to any one legal system.31 In other words, characterisation takes the issue that is in 
 
29 In relation to domestic subject-matter jurisdiction, cf s 4 of the PRA and Mosaed v Mosaed [1997] NZFLR 97 
(CA) for the proposition that the PRA is not a complete code.  
30 Hook (supra n 25). 
31 See, eg, Haugesund Kommune v Depfa ACS Bank [2010] EWCA Civ 579, [2010] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 323, [47] for 
an ‘internationalist’ approach to characterisation.  
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dispute and re-frames it from a conflict of laws perspective. This framing provides many of the 
values that are then used to shape the rules of subject-matter jurisdiction and choice of law.  
 
(a) Characterisation  
The first task in the process of characterisation is to identify the ‘true issue’ in a case.32 Rather 
than fixating on the particular way an issue is classified according to substantive domestic law, 
the focus is on the functions of the underlying substantive rules. 33 Rules that are of the same 
kind should be characterised in the same category, which can then be used to identify subject-
matter limitations and the applicable choice of law. The ultimate aim is to identify ‘the most 
appropriate law to govern a particular issue’. 34 While all substantive rules are a product of their 
underlying legal system, the aim is to rise above formal domestic classifications and adopt a 
characterisation that transcends the different ways in which legal systems are organised.  
Courts have emphasised the need for a pragmatic approach to characterisation, for 
‘commonsense solutions based on practical considerations’.35 Another way of looking at this 
is to say that characterisation requires flexibility, and an openness to whatever considerations 
may be relevant to a particular issue. This may include considerations relating to the substantive 
rules in question. 36  So the courts’ emphasis on the ‘practical’ should not be understood 
narrowly, as an inquiry that discards anything overly aspirational – in the form of social, moral 
or cultural values, for example – and focuses solely on efficiency or predictability or ease of 
application.  
 
32 Schumacher v Summergrove Estates Ltd [2014] NZCA 412, [2014] 3 NZLR 599, [36], adopting the English 
Court of Appeal’s approach in MacMillan Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Trust Plc [1996] 1 WLR 387 (CA).  
33 Dicey, Morris & Collins (supra n 11) para 2-039. 
34 Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG v Five Star General Trading LLC [2001] QB 825 (CA), [27]. 
35 Schumacher v Summergrove Estates Ltd [2014] NZCA 412, [2014] 3 NZLR 599, [35], citing MacMillan Inc v 
Bishopsgate Investment Trust Plc [1996] 1 WLR 387 (CA). 
36 For example, one of the reasons the conflict of laws tends to single out issues of formal validity, rather than 
treating all issues of validity alike, is that the law is often reluctant to strike down bargains on purely ‘technical’ 
grounds. By submitting issues of formal validity to a rule of favor validitatis (ie favouring the legal systems which 
will uphold the formal validity of the agreement), the conflict of laws actively increases the chances of the bargain 




(b) Relevant values 
Modern conflict of laws recognises that there is a broad and open-ended range of values that 
may be of relevance to particular conflicts problems: for example, values related to the 
administration of justice, such as predictability or the speedy, fair, orderly and cost-efficient 
resolution of disputes;37  the parties’ interests in having a particular law applied, perhaps 
because they intended it to be applicable;38 certain regulatory interests of foreign states;39 
concerns relating to cross-border coordination – in particular, whether the court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction would interfere with foreign proceedings, or whether its judgment would be 
enforceable overseas;40 and even ‘substantive’ values, such as the need to offer protection to 
particular groups of claimants.41 This is not an exhaustive list of possible considerations.  
The broad and open-ended approach is a departure from the closed view of the conflict 
of laws that treated the discipline as a hard science more than a man-made body of law. The 
(implicit) goal of this closed view was to free the discipline from the need to manage different 
sets of values. Thus, Savigny’s theory of the natural ‘seat’ assumed, as a matter of fact, that 
each legal relation has a law to which it ‘belongs’.42 Similarly, the principle of territoriality, 
which was central to both Story’s and Dicey’s conceptualisation of the subject,43 reflected the 
 
37 See, eg, Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye [1990] 3 SCR 1077, 1096-7 (‘… the rules of private international 
law are grounded in the need in modern times to facilitate the flow of wealth, skills and people across state lines in a 
fair and orderly manner … what must underlie a modern system of private international law are principles of order 
and fairness, principles that ensure security of transactions with justice.’).  
38 See, eg, Vita Food Products Inc v Unus Shipping Co Ltd [1939] AC 277 (PC); New Zealand Basing Ltd v Brown 
[2016] NZCA 525, [2017] 2 NZLR 93, [58] and [65] (reversed on appeal, on the basis of statutory interpretation 
rather than conflict of laws reasoning).  
39 See, eg, Ludgater Holdings Ltd v Gerling Australia Insurance Co Pty Ltd [2010] NZSC 49, [2010] 3 NZLR 
713 (relating to a foreign debt).   
40 See, eg, Ludgater Holdings Ltd v Gerling Australia Insurance Co Pty Ltd [2010] NZSC 49, [2010] 3 NZLR 
713, [29] (that the court is precluded from making an order in relation to foreign assets that would be inconsistent 
with the foreign insolvency regime); Schumacher v Summergrove Estates Ltd [2014] NZCA 412, [2014] 3 NZLR 
599, [37] and [42].   
41 See, eg, Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Act 2003, s 137 (NZ).  
42 See FC von Savigny, System des heutigen Römischen Rechts (transl Guthrie, 1869) vol VIII, 89, section 360.  
43 J Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws (Little, Brown and Company, 7th edn, 1872) ss 17-18; and AV 
Dicey, A Digest of the Law of England (Stevens and Sons, 2nd edn, 1908) ‘Introduction’.  
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idea that acts were necessarily located in any one jurisdiction, and that they were, therefore, 
logically connected with that jurisdiction. English courts had intuitively adopted the principle 
of territoriality when they were first faced with conflicts of laws;44 and over time, influenced 
by scholarship, they came to rely more generally on the idea that matters should be governed 
by the law most closely connected.45 The principle of close connection seemed to offer a 
geographical, normatively self-sufficient way of resolving conflicts of laws. Anything that was 
a matter of public law or policy, on the other hand – matters that were too burdened by social, 
moral or political values – simply fell outside of the scope of the conflict of laws.46  
But despite the appearance of neutral self-sufficiency, an inquiry into the ‘connection’ 
of relationships to legal systems is necessarily an inquiry into values. The conflict of laws has 
long recognised that the idea of territoriality is only a means to an end, and that connecting 
factors should, where appropriate, advance comity, meet the parties’ reasonable expectations 
and produce predictable results. 47   Indeed, the principle of close connection, far from 
embodying some kind of self-contained a priori method, is a tool for pluralism.48 It begs to be 
filled with meaning. What amounts to a ‘close’ connection? Why do we recognise foreign 
connections?  What values do we use to identify what connections are relevant? Is the 
connection to be based on, say, personal factors, so that the applicable law is one with which 
the individual identifies, or is it to be based on socio-political factors, such as the bond of 
citizenship?49  
 
44 See P Nygh, ‘The Territorial Origin of English Private international Law’ (1964) 2 University of Tasmania Law 
Review 28.  
45 FA Mann said that ‘[t]he whole of the conflict of laws is concerned with the question: which, in a given situation, 
is the law closely or most closely connected with the matter in issue?’: FA Mann, ‘The Proper Law in the Conflict 
of Laws’ (1987) 36 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 437, 438.   
46 Savigny (supra n 42), section 349; O Kahn-Freund, ‘Reflections on Public Policy in the English Conflict of 
Laws’ (1953) 39 Transactions of the Grotius Society 39, 43.  
47 Dicey, Morris and Collins (supra n 11) ch 1; AJE Jaffey, Topics in Choice of Law (BIICL, 1996) ch 1. 
48 On a pluralist theory of the conflict of laws, cf P Schiff Berman, ‘Conflict of Laws and the Legal Negotiation 
of Difference’ in Austin Sarat et al, Law and the Stranger (Stanford University Press, 2010) 141; P Schiff Berman, 
‘Choice of Law and Jurisdiction on the Internet’ (2005) 153 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1819.  
49 See K Knop, ‘Citizenship Public and Personal’ (2008) 71 Law & Contemporary Problems 309, 319-20, on the 
contrasting values behind domicile and citizenship.  
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Hence, modern conflict of laws is about more than the mindless counting of 
geographical connections. It evaluates the meaningfulness of connections; and it does not close 
its eyes to the policy implications of its rules, or to the downstream effects of their application.50 
In other words, it practises an open-ended normative self-awareness.51 For example, liability 
for personal injury is governed by the law of the place where the injury was sustained,52 not 
because that place has the greatest geographical connection with the claim, but because of a 
policy choice to prioritise ‘the claimant’s law’ over ‘the wrong-doer’s law’.53 This choice 
reflects one of the main objectives of modern personal injury law, which is to compensate the 
victim, ‘whose expectations will … be based on his rights and liabilities under the law of the 
country where he was harmed and with which he will usually be independently connected’.54  
This does not mean that ‘anything goes’. As we have just seen, the process of 
characterisation is designed to aid in the identification of relevant values; and as a principled 
and rational system of law, the conflict of laws must strive for normative coherence.  This 
coherence is achieved through an explorative and contextual engagement with values, rather 
than a mechanistic application of pre-determined principles.55 It is not useful, for example, to 
fall back on ‘the parties’ reasonable and legitimate expectations’, ‘comity’, and ‘public law or 
policy’ in the abstract, without exploring what they really mean in relation to a particular issue, 
and to what extent they are, in fact, relevant.56 In the abstract, such principles have a tendency 
 
50 Cf O Kahn-Freund, General Problems of Private international Law (Sijthoff, 1976) 259 on the functional 
diversification of connecting factors. 
51 On a self-conscious, explicit engagement with the values behind conflicts of laws, cf Berman (supra n 48); L 
Little, ‘Conflict of Laws Structure and Vision: Updating a Venerable Discipline’ (2015) 31 Georgia State 
University Law Review 231; A Riles, ‘Cultural Conflicts’ (2008) 71 Law and Contemporary Problems 273.  
52 Private international Law (Choice of Law in Tort) Act 2018, s 8(1)(a).  
53 See English and Scottish Law Commissions, Private international Law: Choice of Law in Tort and Delict 
(Working Paper No 87/Consultative Memorandum No 62) para 4.78. 
54 Ibid, paras 4.74, 4.70. 
55 Thus, framing the problem around a personal-public dichotomy is not helpful: see A Mills, ‘The Identities of 
Private international Law’ (2013) Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 445, 473: ‘Advocating for 
a particular ‘identity’ for private international law may therefore ultimately best be characterized less as a contest 
of legal arguments or traditions, and more as a choice between competing values.’  
56 Jaffey (supra n 47) ch 1 (‘The Foundations of Choice of Law Rules’). 
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to conceal rather than illuminate. The principle of the parties’ reasonable expectations, for 
example, could be used to take account of the parties’ ability to identify with a legal system, 
their geographical, personal or social connectedness to a country, the extent to which the 
connection was shared, their original assumption that a particular law would govern, or any 
other factor that a reasonable party in the circumstances would consider to be relevant. And 
while comity and the parties’ expectations are important yardsticks to measure the 
effectiveness of conflict of laws rules, they are not – and should not – be our sole reference 
points.  
 
D.  A first principles examination of New Zealand’s conflicts rules on couples’ property  
The purpose of this Section is to inquire into the relevant values that should shape New 
Zealand’s conflicts rules on couples’ property, by working through the three steps for devising 
rules of subject-matter jurisdiction and choice of law: characterisation, identification of 
subject-matter limitations, and the selection of appropriate connecting factors for the purposes 
of choice of law. As we have just seen, this inquiry should make full use of the pluralist 
potential of the modern conflict of laws.  
The upshot of this, of course, is that there is much scope for debate about the ‘right’ 
conflicts approach to couples’ property. This paper argues that we should adopt an 
internationalist approach.57 We should focus on the couple’s proprietary relationship, rather 
than the property, in order to facilitate the effective dissolution of the ‘personal property 
relationship’ and recognise its personal and social connections to foreign legal systems. 
 
1. Characterisation of personal relationships and their effect on property 
 
57 On ‘internationalism’ as a basic conflicts approach, see M Pryles, ‘Internationalism in Australian Private 
international Law’ (1989) 12 Sydney Law Review 96. 
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The starting point for determining the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over claims relating 
to couples’ property, and for identifying the appropriate choice of law rule(s) for such claims, 
is the process of characterisation. If the PRA did not already come with its own unilateral 
choice of law rule defining the scope of its application, then how would we characterise its 
rules – or similar foreign rules, for that matter – to determine the circumstances in which it 
ought to be applicable?  
 
(a) Focus on the relationship, not the property  
The function of the PRA is to divide up a couple’s property following the end of their 
relationship. Are the rules of the PRA similar in that sense to, say, applications for ancillary 
relief under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (England and Wales) (the English Act)? English 
law does not provide for the sharing of property acquired in the course of a relationship, but 
vests the court with a discretion to redistribute property upon dissolution of a marriage.58 Or 
are they similar to constructive trust claims alleging an unconscionable assertion of ownership 
by one spouse or partner, to property to which the other spouse or partner has contributed? An 
inquiry into this question shows that the PRA should be characterised so as to focus on the 
couple’s relationship, not their property,  
When answering this question, it is important not to focus too much on the form of the 
claim. The fact that constructive trust claims are equitable in nature should not prevent them 
from being considered in the same conflict of laws category as applications under the PRA. It 
is the issue, and not the claim, that is to be characterised, by reference to the function of the 
substantive rules. Similarly, the fact that English law deals with couples’ property by way of 
ancillary relief upon dissolution of the relationship, and does not provide for what is 
 
58 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.  
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conventionally understood as a matrimonial property regime, should not automatically lead to 
the English rules being characterised differently from applications under the PRA.59  
So it would be necessary to ask, for instance, whether the conflict of laws should draw 
a distinction between rules that create rights in the division of couples’ property, and rules that 
simply confer a judicial discretion to re-distribute property once a relationship has been 
dissolved (as does the English Act), and rules that seek to reverse the wrongful deprivation of 
rights between spouses or partners (as do constructive trusts). Are these rules sufficiently 
functionally similar for the purposes of the conflict of laws?  
This is not a matter of science but judgement. If the conflict of laws chooses to focus 
on the proprietary dimensions of the rules on couples’ property, and to view the parties as, first 
and foremost, property rights holders, it might well distinguish between rules that create a right 
to share in couples’ property (like the rules in the PRA), and rules like sections 23 and 24 of 
the English Act that provide for a discretion to redistribute property between former spouses. 
The starting point would be the particular property that is said to have been affected by the 
relationship, and the question who has rights in the particular property.60 The conflict of laws 
would prioritise property-related considerations, such as security of title, enforceability in the 
place where the property is located, and third party interests in the property. 61  Some US 
common law systems adopt a clearly proprietary view of couples’ property conflicts, leading 
them to distinguish between movable and immovables, and to apply the law of domicile at the 
 
59 But cf English criticism of the Council Regulation (EU) No 2016/1103 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced 
cooperation in the area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters 
of matrimonial property regimes [2016] OJ L183/1 in Bar Council of England and Wales, ‘Response of the Bar 
Council of England and Wales to the Green Paper’ (2006) and Resolution, ‘Response to Green Paper on Conflict 
of Laws in Matters Concerning Matrimonial Property Regimes, Including Question of Jurisdiction and Mutual 
Recognition’ (2006).  
60 Cf s 7, PRA. 
61 See, eg, MacMillan Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Trust Plc [1996] 1 WLR 387 (CA), on the reasons for the lex 
situs rule.  
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time of acquisition of the property.62 English common law rules are more ambiguous but follow 
the same distinction between movable and immovable property.63 
On the other hand, if the conflict of laws chooses to focus on the nature of the parties’ 
relationship, it might be more concerned with the unique ‘institutional’ function of couples’ 
property rules. To that end, it might treat the PRA, civil law property regimes, the English Act 
and even constructive trusts as going to the same question: to what extent does the fact that the 
parties are (or were) in a personal relationship bear on the allocation or distribution of property 
between them, either in the course of, or upon dissolution of, their relationship? An important 
concern of many of these laws is the protection of parties who contribute to the relationship 
through non-financial means (rather than the acquisition of assets). If this is the focus, the 
conflict of laws would design rules that, above all, facilitate the cross-border treatment of the 
property consequences of personal relationships (rather than the determination of rights in 
particular property).  
In this author’s view, this latter approach based on the property consequences of the 
relationship (or the ‘personal property relationship’) is preferable to a strict focus on property. 
One of the main purposes of the PRA is to recognise non-financial contributions to personal 
relationships.64 The Act ‘operates upon ‘property’ … [but is] aimed at supporting the ethical 
and moral undertakings exchanged by [couples]’.65 So it would be unduly legalistic – and self-
defeating – to characterise questions of couples’ property through a narrow proprietary lens. 
Conflict of laws rules such as the lex situs rule do not seem to capture adequately the economic 
realities of personal relationships – the role of non-financial contributions, and the way spouses 
or partners relate to each other or to the societies they live in. The conflict of laws should strive 
to respond to these realities. This does not mean that it cannot take into account property-
 
62 Symeon Symeonides, Choice of Law (Oxford University Press, 2016) 604. 
63 Dicey, Morris & Collins (supra n 11) ch 28. 
64 PRA, s 1N(b) 
65 Reid v Reid [1979] 1 NZLR 572 (CA) 580. 
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specific concerns, such as the enforceability of judgments over foreign land, but these concerns 
should not distort the overall approach to characterisation. A focus on the relationship is also 
more closely aligned with the predominant approach taken by civil law jurisdictions, which 
tend to focus on the parties rather than the property.66   
 
(b)   Issues relating to the ‘property consequences’ of ‘personal relationships’ 
If the proposed rules are to capture issues relating to the property consequences of personal 
relationships, it will be necessary to determine what kinds of relationships amount to a 
qualifying ‘personal relationship’ for the purposes of the rules, and what kinds of claims can 
be considered to deal with the ‘property consequences’ of personal relationships.  
 
(i)   Personal relationships - It has already been noted that the PRA applies to formal and 
informal relationships, including marriage, civil unions and de facto relationships. Many other 
jurisdictions approach things differently, however. They may exclude informal relationships 
from regulation, or they may maintain a distinct regime for relationships other than marriage. 
The question is whether these differences should be reflected on the level of the conflict of 
laws, too. European Union law, for example, has distinct regimes for married couples and 
registered partnerships.67  
 In the New Zealand context, the better view is that the conflict of laws should not 
maintain parallel regimes for different relationships. This is consistent with the PRA’s 
substantive rules, which do not distinguish between different kinds of relationships. It also 
reflects one of the principal aims of characterisation, which is to bridge cross-border 
differences by capturing rules that are similar in function, even if they differ in form and content. 
 
66 See, eg, EU Reg on Matrimonial Property (supra n 59).   
67 Ibid; Council Regulation (EU) No 2016/1104 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area 
of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of the property 
consequences of registered partnerships [2016] OJ L 183/30.  
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Thus, whether a claim relates to the property consequences of a relationship, in a way that is 
functionally similar to claims under the PRA, is a question for the conflict of laws. But 
questions relating to the particular form of the relationship, and whether it is of a kind to qualify 
for relief, should in principle be questions for the applicable law.68 
 There is much diversity in the way that countries approach formal relationships other 
than marriage. The proposed approach may cause difficulties where the applicable law is 
narrowly drafted so as to apply to formal relationships specific to that country. In such cases, 
it is important that the applicable law also accords recognition to similar foreign relationships. 
New Zealand law does so via the Civil Union Act 2004. Thus, the PRA applies to ‘civil unions’, 
which means either a civil union entered into under the Civil Union Act 2004 or an overseas 
relationship recognised by the Civil Unions (Recognised Overseas Relationships) Regulations 
2005. 69  The number of relationships currently recognised by the Regulations is limited, 
however, so the practical utility of this particular regime may be questioned. In practice, it is 
more likely that the PRA will apply to similar foreign relationships on the basis that the couple 
are also in a de facto relationship.   
 
(ii)   Property consequences - In relation to the second question, too, a broad approach is 
beneficial. A claim will relate to the ‘property consequences’ of a personal relationship even if 
it differs in form or substance from claims under the PRA. So it would be immaterial, for 
example, whether the claim is based on a foreign law that, unlike New Zealand law, recognises 
full community of property, or treats couples’ property and maintenance as one and the same 
question,70 as long as the foreign law deals with the same problem as the PRA. 
 
68 If the relationship is recognised in one jurisdiction but not another, this may well be a factor in identifying the 
applicable law: see infra D3(c). 
69 S 5, Civil Union Act 2004. 
70 eg Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (England and Wales); see Schuz (supra n 1); but cf English criticism of the 
then proposed EU Reg on Matrimonial Property (supra n 59), on the basis that English law (in the form of a 
21 
 
 A difficult question in this context is whether the proposed conflict of laws rules should 
go so far as to extend to issues of maintenance. New Zealand law currently treats maintenance 
and relationship property as separate issues.71 The purpose of maintenance is to meet the 
applicant’s reasonable needs following separation;72 the purpose of orders under the PRA is 
the just division of relationship property. On one view, the conflict of laws should reflect this 
functional distinction. An obligation to pay maintenance may raise different conflicts 
considerations from the division of property. For example, the relevant connecting factor may 
take account of the couple’s current circumstances, including their current place of residence, 
instead of focusing on the couple’s past relationship;73 or it may reflect a policy of protecting 
the creditor.74  
Yet there would certainly be benefits to applying the same law to both couples’ property 
and maintenance. In some countries they are treated as functionally equivalent.75 Even where 
they are kept separate, they are necessarily closely connected. Thus, under New Zealand law, 
a court may have to take account of maintenance payments to determine a just division of 
relationship property, or it may have to take account of orders for the division of property to 
determine the applicant’s need for maintenance.76 If couples’ property and maintenance are 
governed by separate laws, there may be limited scope to ensure that the regimes operate 
consistently, which may lead to injustice.77 Moreover, the New Zealand Law Commission has 
proposed that the two regimes be merged,78 which would strengthen the case for extending the 
 
judicial discretion under the Matrimonial Causes Act to re-distribute property once a relationship has been 
dissolved) serves a different function to civil law matrimonial property regimes: supra n 59. 
71 Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 64. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Cf s 4, Family Proceedings Act 1980; Hague Protocol on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations 
(opened for signature 23 November 2007, entered into force 1 August 2013) Art 3. 
74 Cf Hague Maintenance Protocol (ibid) Art 3. 
75 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (UK). 
76 See Law Commission (supra n 3) paras 19.59ff.  
77 But note that New Zealand currently applies the lex fori to questions of maintenance, and that the New Zealand 
law of maintenance provides sufficient flexibility to take account of previous orders for the division of property: 
ss 4 and 65(2)(a)(ii), Family Proceedings Act 1980; Law Commission (supra n 3) para 19.66.  
78 Law Commission Review of the Property Relationships Act 1976 – Preferred Approach (NZLC IP44, 2018). 
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conflict of laws rules to maintenance. This question would benefit from further analysis by 
reference to the law of maintenance, particularly if the Law Commission’s proposal is adopted.  
 
(c) Focus on the social and personal dimensions of the relationship 
Before turning to the questions of subject-matter jurisdiction and choice of law, it is useful to 
inquire further into the nature of personal property relationships. Should the relationship be 
approached as a social construct, a relationship that needs to be regulated within its social 
context (that is, in accordance with the interests or policies of the wider community)? If so, the 
conflict of laws may identify communities to which the parties belong (so as to emphasise 
connections with these communities),79 or it may pursue substantive social goals.80 Or should 
the conflict of laws be more concerned with the personal nature of the relationship, as a 
relationship between two individuals, who may identify with one legal order more than another, 
or who may have made certain assumptions about the laws that would govern their affairs?81 
These personal connections may also be shaped by the parties’ cultural or religious 
background.82  
There is no a priori discoverable seat to be allocated to the relationship,83 and so it is 
up to the conflict of laws to strike the best balance. In this author’s view, it would be useful to 
recognise the multifaceted nature of personal property relationships, and to focus on both their 
personal and social dimensions.84  
 
79 G Kegel, ‘The Crisis of the Conflict of Laws’ (1964) 112 Recueil des Cours 92, 186. 
80 See, eg, Hague Maintenance Protocol (supra n 73) Art 4.  
81 See T Hartley, ‘Matrimonial (Marital) Property Rights in Conflict of Laws: a Reconsideration’ in J Fawcett 
(ed), Reform and Development of Personal Internatioanl Law: Essays in Honour of Sir Peter North (Oxford 
University Press, 2003) 215, 225 (‘the justification for applying the law of the domicile is that it is likely to reflect 
the values, attitudes and expectations of the parties’).  
82 For example, an orthodox Jewish couple who are domiciled in New Zealand but have organised their affairs on 
the basis of Jewish law. See E Jayme, ‘Identité culturelle et intégration: le droit international privé postmoderne’ 
(1995) 251 Recueil des Cours 9.  
83 See supra C2(b); Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG v Five Star General Trading LLC [2001] QB 825 (CA), 
[27]. 
84 Cf the exclusionary effect of the public-personal dichotomy on conflict of laws reasoning: see supra.  
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The ‘personal’ dimension is a familiar feature in conflict of laws reasoning. People craft 
their personal relationships within certain legal contexts. They make assumptions about the 
rights and obligations that will govern them; they may have organised their affairs on that basis; 
and they may identify with certain legal systems or communities (places they call home, or at 
least feel personally connected to).85 These are all worthy values for the conflict of laws to take 
into account, and they are commonly considered under the umbrella of ‘reasonable and 
legitimate expectations’.86 They are values that are focused on the individuals, as actors on the 
international plane.  
This does not mean, however, that international couples are somehow detached from 
the social environment within which they live. The function of the PRA (and similar laws) is 
to recognise contributions to personal relationships and manage their consequences for 
property. It is concerned with the organisation of family life, and so it is, at heart, a piece of 
social legislation.87 The conflict of laws should not divorce personal property relationships 
from their social setting, the communities within which they operate, simply because the 
relationship has foreign elements (or there is more than one community that may have a 
regulatory claim).88 It should recognise the social function of couples’ property law, in order 
to reflect the place of the relationship within societal structures.89  
This emphasis on the social dimension will obviously affect the connections that the 
conflict of laws considers to be relevant. The connections will draw on the social values that 
underlie the law on couples’ property, which may even include principles of substantive law. 
An important principle that comes to mind in this context is that of gender equality or non-
discrimination. The conflict of laws should contribute to the creation of fair and just societies, 
 
85 See Y Nishitani, ‘Global Citizens and Family Relations’ [2014] Erasmus Law Review 134. 
86 Dicey, Morris & Collins (supra n 11) para 1-005. 
87 Reid v Reid [1979] 1 NZLR 572 (CA) 580. 
88 For the point that cross-border relations tend to have multiple ‘community affiliations’, see Schiff Berman 
‘Conflict of Laws and the Legal Negotiation of Difference’ (supra n 48). 
89 See the argument supra, that characterisation is undertaken by reference to the function of the substantive law. 
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and not perpetuate existing injustices. For example, an exclusive focus on the husband’s 
domicile clearly should form no part of a modern system of conflict of laws.90  
It is now time to consider in more detail what this conclusion – that the conflict of laws 
should focus on the personal property relationship, and its personal and social dimensions – 
means for the scope of the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and the question of choice of law.  
 
2.   Universal subject-matter jurisdiction  
The New Zealand conflict of laws limits the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over matters it 
considers to be inherently territorial in nature,91 although increasingly it has dropped subject-
matter limitations in favour of taking an overall more coordinated approach to jurisdiction.92 
This paper argues that the court should have near universal subject-matter jurisdiction to hear 
couples’ property claims, subject to a power to decline jurisdiction (over the claim as a whole 
or specific property). In particular, jurisdiction should not be confined to relationships (or 
parties) that have a close personal connection to New Zealand (Pt (a)); and it should also extend 
to foreign immovables (Pt (b)).  
 
(a) No exclusion of particular relationships  
Personal property relationships do not raise issues that are inherently territorial. They are not 
inextricably linked with domestic procedures, infrastructure or control (as is the creation of 
intellectual property rights, for example, or the in rem transfer of property). They need not be 
characterised as a public matter, that is concerned with the exercise of state authority and 
 
90 Dicey, Morris & Collins (supra n 11) para 28-011. 
91 Hook (supra n 25) 449. 
92 For example, Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v Van Veen HC Wellington CIV-2004-485-1520, 
14 December 2006, [19] (that the Mocambique rule should not exclude jurisdiction in respect of actions for breach 
of foreign intellectual property rights); Schumacher v Summergrove Estates Ltd [2013] NZHC 1387 (that the 
Mocambique rule did not exclude jurisdiction in respect of a constructive trust claim), but contrast Burt v 
Yiannakis [2015] NZHC 1174, [2015] NZFLR 739 (HC); see also the court’s relatively recent power in r 7.81 of 
the High Court Rules to grant interim relief in aid of foreign proceedings, or implementation of the Model Law 
on Cross-Border Insolvency in the Insolvency (Cross-border) Act 2006. 
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protection of local societies or markets (as is criminal law, for example, or competition law).  
They are also clearly distinguishable from the dissolution of marriage, which is concerned with 
the couple’s status and may still be treated as a matter in rem;93 and they do not compare to the 
winding up of a company.94  
Rather, they are concerned with the couple’s in personam rights and obligations, which 
is not a matter that ordinarily attracts subject-matter limitations. In these circumstances, the 
principal reason why the conflict of laws may potentially impose limitations on subject-matter 
jurisdiction would be as a result of applying a unilateral choice of law rule, to manage the scope 
of the application of the law of the forum. 95 We will consider this question – whether personal 
property relationships should be governed by the lex fori – below. 
It follows that the court’s jurisdiction should not be confined to specific relationships 
(such as couples who are, or were, domiciled in New Zealand).96 Any subject-matter limitation 
of this kind would pose a risk that claimants may be unduly deprived of their access to justice.97  
 
(b) Inclusion of immovables 
This leaves the question of subject-matter jurisdiction over foreign immovables. The starting 
point is that, if the ‘true issue’ is the personal property relationship, and not the property, it 
would be desirable to determine the matter on a holistic (universal) basis. There is one issue 
(the property consequences of the relationship), to be determined in one jurisdiction; not 
 
93 Salvesen v Administrator of Austrian Property [1927] AC 641, 662 (Viscount Dunedin); although subject-
matter limitations on divorce may now be motivated mainly by the desire to apply the lex fori rule (which, in turn, 
requires subject-matter limitations to limit the scope of the law of the forum). 
94 Dicey, Morris & Collins (supra n 11) Rule 176, on the court’s jurisdiction to wind up companies that are 
registered in England or sufficiently closely connected to the forum.  
95 See Hook (supra n 25) 450. 
96 For criticism of the use of matrimonial domicile as a basis for jurisdiction in divorce, see Law Commission 
(England and Wales), Family Law: Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Causes (other than Nullity) (Working Paper No 
28, April 1970) 13.  
97  On the need for access to justice, see Law Commission (England and Wales), Family Law: Report on 
Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Causes (No 48, 1972) 5-6. If subject-matter limitations are considered necessary, they 
should at least be accompanied by a principle of forum necessitatis.  
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numerous issues (rights in particular items of property), to be determined in numerous 
jurisdictions. This is also increasingly the approach taken to succession and insolvency.98 On 
that basis, therefore, the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction should extend to allow the court to 
take into account all property, movables and immovables, wherever located. An added benefit 
of this approach is that it avoids tricky problems in classification (for example, are pension 
rights immovable or movable, 99 and what about the proceeds of sale from foreign land? 100). 
There are countervailing considerations, however, that ought to be taken into account. 
The first is that the court should not make orders that it is not capable of enforcing.101 Hence, 
the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction should not extend to orders vesting title (in rem) in 
foreign property, especially if title depends on registration. Such an order would lack any basis 
in reality, because it would depend on local authorities to enforce it, who may very well 
disagree with the order. Jurisdiction must instead be limited to in personam relief (for example, 
in the form of an order that the defendant pass title; or a compensation order that simply takes 
into account the value of the property).  
Even then, it is no small matter for a court to make an in personam order in relation to 
foreign immovables, which may form an intricate part of the legal, political and social fabric 
of the situs. This is especially so if there is a chance that the courts of the situs would have dealt 
with the matter differently or – worse – if they will grant conflicting relief. The latter scenario 
would also be a source of real injustice for the parties.  
Nevertheless, my view is that in personam orders in relation to immovables – or, indeed, 
orders that merely take into account the value of foreign immovables – should not ordinarily 
 
98 Insolvency (Cross-border) Act 2006 (NZ); in relation to succession, see, eg, Dicey, Morris & Collins (supra n 
11) Rules 147-8. 
99 See Tyson v Tyson [2000] NZFLR 927 (DC); Fischbach v Bonnar [2002] NZFLR 705 (FC); cf EU Reg on 
Matrimonial Property (supra n 124) Art 1(2)(f) excluding pensions from its scope. 
100 See Shepherd v Shepherd [2009] NZFLR 226 (HC). 
101 See, eg, Société Eram Shipping Co Ltd v Cie Internationale de Navigation [2003] UKHL 30, [2004] 1 AC 260, 
[26] per Lord Bingham (‘I would not accept that the court has power to make an order which, if made, would lack 
what has been legislatively stipulated to be a necessary consequence of such an order’); followed recently in 
Taurus Petroleum Ltd v State Oil Company of the Ministry of Oil, Iraq [2015] EWCA Civ 835.  
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be considered out of bounds. It is not uncommon for other jurisdictions to provide for such a 
power in the context of claims relating to couples’ property;102 and the Moçambique rule, too, 
is now arguably too narrow to present a barrier to jurisdiction.103 There even seems to be 
movement towards the (indirect) enforcement of foreign in personam orders relating to 
domestic land.104 And it seems incongruous and outdated to recognise the court’s jurisdiction 
in relation to foreign immovables for the purpose of the administration of an estate or trust but 
not for the purpose of couples’ property,105 especially because parties would not usually expect 
the courts of the situs to retain exclusive jurisdiction.106 Overall, the benefits of universalism 
should trump any lingering concerns relating to comity, sovereignty or socio-political 
overreach.  
These concerns may be accommodated, instead, by a more flexible approach to subject-
matter jurisdiction that has as its primary goal the effective coordination of couples’ property 
claims across borders. To that end, courts should have a discretion to decline the exercise of 
jurisdiction, over the claim as a whole or in relation to particular property.107 Where the relief 
granted in relation to foreign property is unlikely to be effective, or where there is a risk of 
irreconcilable decisions, or where another court has already assumed jurisdiction, the court 
should consider its role in the dissolution of the personal property relationship and be prepared 
to adjust the form of relief or,108 exceptionally, to decline judgment.109 This should also be the 
 
102 See, eg, EU Reg on Matrimonial Property (supra n 59); Hamlin v Hamlin [1986] Fam 11. 
103 See supra B3.    
104 See TM Yeo, ‘The Effective Reach of In Personam Reasoning in Private international Law’ (Yong Pung How 
Professorship of Law Lecture, 2009) <http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/yph_lect/2> [37]-[44]; cf Shami v Shami 
[2012] EWHC 664 (a case on recognition). 
105 On this exception to the Mocambique rule, see Dicey, Morris & Collins (supra n 11) Rule 131. 
106 But cf Burt v Yiannakis [2015] NZHC 1174, [2015] NZFLR 739 (HC), [54]. 
107  Cf s 7(3); EU Regulation No 650/2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of 
decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation 
of a European Certificate of Succession  [2012] OJ L 201/107, Art 12.  
108 See the PRA on the different forms of relief available.  
109 This should be an evidence-based decision.   
28 
 
case if the property in question is situated in New Zealand: an approach based on universalism 
does not support a protectionist mindset.  
 
3.   Choice of law: a multilateral choice of law rule, subject to party choice  
It is now necessary to turn to the second main function of the conflict of laws, choice of law, 
and to ask what is the most appropriate law to govern the property consequences of personal 
relationships? This paper argues that the choice of law rule should be multilateral in nature 
(meaning a choice of law rule that may lead to the application of foreign law), and that it should 
give effect to the law with the closest connection based on the personal and social dimensions 
of the relationships. In addition, the parties should be free to choose the applicable law.  
 
(a) Multilateralism over unilateralism  
The first point to determine is whether personal property relationships should be governed by 
the law of the forum (based on a unilateral approach), or whether they may also be governed 
by foreign law (based on a multilateral approach). Multilateral choice of law rules work well 
where the relevant substantive laws are functionally similar to those in other countries. The 
greater the disparity in functions, the more difficult it is to devise a meaningful two-way 
connecting factor. This paper has argued that the PRA is concerned with the property 
consequences of personal relationships and that, in that sense, it is functionally similar to 
comparative regimes in other jurisdictions. It follows that a multilateral choice of law rule 
would be appropriate in principle. The benefit of such a rule would be that it recognises relevant 
connections between the relationship and the applicable law, regardless of whether the 
connections are foreign or domestic. These connections may reflect the personal and social 
dimensions of the relationship, giving effect, for example, to the parties’ expectations that a 
particular law will apply, or to community ties with the couple’s place of residence. 
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A broad unilateral approach, on the other hand, would disregard these connections in 
order to prioritise domestic policies. Such an approach may be consistent with a focus on the 
social dimension of the relationship in particular. For example, the principle of equal sharing 
in the PRA might be a social policy of such importance that it should be applied to all personal 
property relationships, even if they are only loosely connected to New Zealand. It is no small 
thing for the New Zealand court to apply foreign laws that, based on domestic standards, run 
counter to the principle of just division,110 especially if the claim has some connection to New 
Zealand. Thus, in an area of law like couples’ property that strikes at the heart of a country’s 
social values, lawmakers will have to think carefully before giving effect to foreign notions of 
justice.111  
But on balance, these concerns should not trump the values underpinning the principle 
of connection. Unilateral choice of law rules are inherently parochial and should be used 
sparingly where a multilateral connecting factor is feasible in principle. In addition to denying 
meaningful connections between a claim and foreign legal systems, they result in overlapping 
applicable laws and encourage forum shopping. Most common law choice of law rules 
traditionally adopt a multilateral approach: for example, the law applicable to a contract, in the 
absence of choice by the parties, is the law with the closest and most real connection;112 the 
general choice of law rule for property is the lex situs;113 and the common law choice of law 
rules on (movable) matrimonial property are based on the law of the matrimonial domicile.114 
Even in areas that have traditionally been forum-focused, like the law of torts, the New Zealand 
 
110 See PRA, s 1N.  
111 See F Vischer, ‘General Course on Private international Law’ (1992) 232 Recueil des Cours 9, 123; see the 
Bar Council of England and Wales, ‘Response of the Bar Council of England and Wales to the Green Paper’ 
(2006) and Resolution, ‘Response to Green Paper on Conflict of Laws in Matters Concerning Matrimonial 
Property Regimes, Including Question of Jurisdiction and Mutual Recognition’ (2006).  
112 Bonython v Commonwealth of Australia [1951] AC 201 (PC). 
113 MacMillan Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Trust Plc [1996] 1 WLR 387 (CA). 
114 Dicey, Morris and Collins (supra n 11) Rule 165. 
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conflict of laws has become receptive of foreign rules. 115  Personal property relationships 
should not be an exception. It is worth nothing here that multilateral choice of law rules are 
subject to a public policy exception to ensure the protection of significant forum interests, and 
that this exception would still serve to protect New Zealand’s most fundamental policies on 
couples’ property. 
 Another reason that is sometimes offered in favour of a unilateral approach are the 
difficulties associated with pleading and proving foreign law. 116 These difficulties are not to 
be taken lightly. Parties may not be well equipped to identify conflicts of laws and arrange for 
reliable expert witnesses. It would no doubt be challenging for spouses litigating in New 
Zealand to prove the content of, say, Polish law: they may have to look overseas for a suitable 
expert witness, at considerable expense.117 This concern is particularly valid if the governing 
choice of law rule does not point clearly to one law being applicable. What if there are two or 
three possible contenders, and the parties have to work out their respective positions under each 
to determine whether it is worth pleading foreign law? This is a considerable weakness of 
multilateralism. But it is offset by the benefits that come with the reception of foreign law into 
the forum, both in the particular case and on a more systemic level.  So our efforts should be 
directed at facilitating access to foreign law,118 and aiding in its application,119 rather than at 
the deconstruction of the multilateral method.  
 
 
115 For example, the Private International Law (Choice of Law in Tort) Act 2017 (NZ) recently abolished the 
double actionability rule for torts and replaced it with a general lex loci delicti rule. 
116 See Ministry of Justice (UK), European Commission proposed Regulations on matrimonial property regimes 
and the property consequences of registered partnerships: Response to public consultation (28 November 2011) 
[5]; CMV Clarkson, ‘Matrimonial Property on Divorce: all Change in Europe’ (2008) 4 Journal of Private 
international Law 421, 430.  
117 Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 427, [2011] 1 AC 534, [105], where the Supreme Court noted the 
expense of proving foreign law in the context of maintenance claims. 
118 For international efforts to facilitate access to foreign law, see P Lortie and M Groff, ‘The Evolution of Work 
on Access to Foreign Law at the Hague Conference on Private international Law’ in Y Nishitani (ed), Treatment 
of Foreign Law – Dynamics towards Convergence? (Springer, 2017) 615.  
119 For example, conflicts rules could provide guidance on what to do when the foreign law does not contemplate 
application by courts outside of the forum.   
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(b) Unity  
Another question is whether there should be more than one applicable law to govern different 
aspects of the claim. In principle, because the ‘true’ issue is the dissolution of the personal 
property relationship, the choice of law rule should enable a ‘unitary’ determination of the 
claim based on one applicable law.120 The purpose is not to determine rights in particular 
property but to administer the proprietary consequences of the relationship as a whole. This 
can be achieved more easily and coherently if there is only one law to be applied.121 It is also 
unrealistic to think that the parties would have expected their claim to be fragmented across 
several laws. Consequently, one law should govern both movable and immovable property, 
and there is no room for a principle of mutability that requires application (and re-application) 
of the relevant connecting factor as property is being acquired.  
None of this is to say that the unitary approach should be rigid and without exception. 
An obvious drawback of the approach is that it does not give a voice to the situs of immovable 
property, which, in some circumstances, may have a strong regulatory claim to matters 
affecting the property, or which, in any case, might not enforce an order that is inconsistent 
with the lex situs. A possible mechanism to address such concerns would be to provide for the 
application of overriding mandatory rules of the situs.122 For example, a New Zealand court 
that has been asked to determine matters relating to a family home situated overseas could be 
given the option of applying any overriding mandatory rules of the lex situs relating to such 
matters.  
 
(c) The proposed multilateral connecting factor  
 
120 See also EU Reg on Matrimonial Property (supra n 59) Art 21 and Recital 43; EU Succession Regulation 
(supra n 107) Art 23 and Recital 37; cf Slutsker v Haron Investments Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 430, [37]. 
121 On the benefits of a unitary approach, see Jan von Hein, ‘Conflicts between International Property, Family and 
Succession Law – Interfaces and Regulatory Techniques’ (2017) 6 European Property Law Journal 142, 143-7. 
122 Cf EU Succession Reg (supra n 107) Art 30; see von Hein (ibid) 147-57. 
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The final task is to devise a multilateral connecting factor that designates the law with the most 
meaningful – the ‘closest’ – connection to personal property relationships. Hidden behind the 
principle of close connection are nuanced values that call for recognition, capturing the 
personal and social dimensions of the relationship. These values include respect for the social 
context of the relationship, and the parties’ agency and expectations in shaping it.123 The 
relationship should be seen as a whole, within the exercise of universal subject-matter 
jurisdiction, and governed by one applicable law. It should be seen as embedded in its social 
environment(s), and within the context of the actual lives lived and crafted by the parties to the 
relationship.124  
Thus, the connecting factor should be sufficiently open-ended to capture the fluid nature 
of such relationships and the variety of connections that may be relevant in each case.125 A 
connecting factor based on the couple’s shared place of domicile or residence, for example, 
could take too closed a view of the relationship. Instead the court should identify the law with 
the closest and most real connection to the relationship, by reference to a non-exhaustive list 
of factors that would give meaning to the kind of ‘connection’ that should be prioritised. 
These factors could include: places of common residence, and the extent to which 
parties are integrated in local society; places of common domicile, and the extent to which 
parties continue to identify with – or have become alienated from – these places; whether the 
place of shared residence is also the domicile of one of the parties; the length of time spent in 
these places, and the length of time that has passed since then; whether the parties organised 
their affairs on the basis of a particular law; whether they expected a particular law to apply; 
and whether the purposes or fundamental principles of couples’ property law favour one 
connection over another. For example, where the parties are in a non-traditional relationship (a 
 
123 Cf Nishitani (supra n 85). 
124 Cf the expression ‘life actually lived’ in EU Reg on Matrimonial Property (supra n 59) Recital 49.  
125 On the benefits of multifactor approaches in choice of law, see L Brilmayer and R Anglin, ‘Choice of Law 
Theory and the Metaphysics of the Stand-Alone Trigger’ (2010) 95 Iowa Law Review 1125. 
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relationship other than marriage, such as a registered partnership, civil union or de facto 
relationship), an important consideration in the court’s assessment should be whether the law 
in question recognises the particular kind of relationship.126   
Balancing these considerations presents an obvious challenge. In some cases, they may 
seem to stand in direct conflict: for example, what is the law with the closest connection if the 
parties first lived ten years in a country they considered home, and then lived ten years in a 
country that was not, however, their domicile? What if the same parties assumed that the law 
of their domicile would govern, but in all other respects they have become alienated from their 
home country? And what if the current place of residence is also the current (or former) place 
of domicile of one of the parties? Or perhaps the domiciled party coerced his or her partner 
into leaving the couple’s home, which may implicate considerations relating to equality and 
weigh against the new place of residence.  
Such cases may be closely balanced. But the subtlety of the inquiry only serves to bring 
home the relative normative vacuity of pre-determined connecting factors (like the parties’ first 
common habitual residence, for example).127 Is it really appropriate, for example, to apply 
French law, as the law of the place where the couple first resided after marriage, if they are 
both domiciled in New Zealand and have not lived in France for 20 years? The lack of nuance 
associated with fixed connecting factors would be a high price to pay for greater predictability; 
and determining the domicile of a person or relationship, or a couple’s place of habitual 
residence, is not necessarily a straightforward exercise, either.  
 
(d) Party choice  
 
126 Otherwise there may be a ‘legal vacuum’, which would be particularly concerning in the case of registered 
relationships: see Council Reg on the Property Consequences of Registered Partnerships (supra n 67) Recital 44.  
127 eg EU Reg on Matrimonial Property (supra n 59) Art 26.  
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This leaves the question to what extent the parties should be free to choose the law applicable 
to their relationship. As has been argued elsewhere, this question should be answered by 
reference to the objective choice of law rule proposed above – and more specifically, by 
reference to the considerations that shape the rule.128 Should the parties be able to contract out 
of the rule, or are the aims that it pursues beyond the proper reach of party autonomy? There is 
obvious value in recognising the parties as autonomous actors on the international plane, and 
enabling them to organise their affairs with certainty and predictability. But the question admits 
no easy answer given the mixed ‘personal’ and ‘social’ assessment that the rule calls for, as 
well as legitimate concerns regarding inequality in bargaining power.129  
On balance, the benefits associated with party choice mean that New Zealand courts 
should give effect to it, even though the parties might choose a law that lacks a social 
connection to their relationship. For example, a young German couple chooses German law to 
govern their relationship before moving to New Zealand and living here for 20 years. If the 
couple separates, this choice should be effective even though, after 20 years, it is likely that the 
relationship has close social ties to New Zealand. New Zealand has provided the social context 
for the relationship, and the local community may have a general interest in having its law 
applied. Yet the value of party autonomy is such that it should trump these ‘public policy’ 
considerations.130 Freedom of contract is not easily denied, as is evidenced by the PRA itself, 
which allows parties to contract out of the principle of equal sharing.131 Moreover, the freedom 
to select the applicable law is consistent with the ‘personal’ elements of the objective choice 
of law rule, which seeks to give effect to the parties’ expectations. 
 
128 M Hook, The Choice of Law Contract (Hart Publishing, 2016) ch 3.  
129 Ibid, 58-62. 
130 Although the rule could recognise a residual role for the law that would have been applicable in the absence of 
agreement, by giving effect to that law’s overriding public policies: Hook (supra n 128) ch 3. 
131 S 21.  
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This conclusion is subject to an important caveat, which is that the parties’ power to 
choose the applicable law should be regulated so as to require a free, fair and informed 
agreement. These safeguards are necessary because personal relationships are prone to 
bounded rationality, uninformed decision-making and inequalities in bargaining power.132 An 
appropriate starting point would be to require an agreement that is both express and in writing, 
and to provide that the parties should have been fully informed of the nature and the possible 
consequences of the agreement.133 Thus, a mere assumption that a certain legal system would 
apply would not be sufficient to amount to a valid choice of law agreement, as is arguably the 
case at common law.134 Instead, it would be a factor in determining the law with the closest 
connection.  
 
4.  Implications for reform 
Applying first principles, this paper has made the case for an internationalist approach to New 
Zealand’s conflict of laws rules on couples’ property. Claims should be characterised as dealing 
with the property consequences of personal relationships. This characterisation emphasises the 
relationship, and not the property, so as to facilitate the effective dissolution of the personal 
property relationship. The relationship should be seen as a whole, within the exercise of 
universal subject-matter jurisdiction and governed by one applicable law. But courts should 
have a discretion to decline the exercise of jurisdiction, over the claim as a whole (on the basis 
that New Zealand is not the appropriate forum) or in relation to particular property (as currently 
provided for by s 7(3) of the PRA), where this is necessary to ensure the just resolution of the 
claim. The applicable law, in the absence of express agreement, should be the law with the 
closest and most real connection to the relationship, based on connections that emphasise its 
 
132 Hook (supra n 128) ch 7. This concern is also reflected in the PRA: ss 21F and s 21J.  
133 Hook (supra n 128) ch 7; cf Hague Maintenance Protocol (supra n 73) Art 8(5). 
134 De Nicols v Curlier [1900] AC 21 (HL); Murakami v Wiryadi [2010] NSWCA 7, (2010) 268 ALR 377, [118]-
[121] should not be followed. Cf Bergner v Nelis HC Auckland CIV-2004-404-149, 19 December 2005, [24]. 
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personal and social dimensions. Where the parties have expressly chosen the applicable law, 
safeguards should be in place to ensure the parties’ free, fair and informed agreement.  
 Based on this proposal, it is clear that New Zealand’s existing rules on couples’ property 
are in need of reform. With the exception of section 7A, the rules are surprisingly inward-
focused, disregarding the values we have just identified: 
 
(1) Section 7 isolates the court, and the parties, against the application of foreign law 
and confers a broad reach on the law of the forum. This means that the PRA may apply 
in some cases that have relatively limited connection to New Zealand. 135  The 
connecting factor of individual domicile, in particular, is very generous. A spouse may 
rely on the PRA to claim an interest in foreign movables on the basis that he or she is 
domiciled in New Zealand, even if the couple never lived together in New Zealand. For 
example, a New Zealander may have entered into a de facto relationship with a French 
person while living in France but may not have formed an intention to live in France 
indefinitely (and, hence, may not have relinquished his New Zealand domicile).136 To 
apply the PRA to such a claim is to deny that the claim has a more meaningful 
connection to France than to New Zealand.   
It is true that the court’s discretion to declare New Zealand forum (non) 
conveniens has a tempering effect on how far section 7 reaches in practice. Thus, if a 
relationship has minimal connection to New Zealand, the respondent spouse or partner 
would likely protest the court’s jurisdiction or seek a stay of proceedings on the basis 
that it is not the appropriate forum to hear the claim.137 In addition, the PRA itself offers 
a tool to moderate its scope, by empowering the court, in section 7(3), to decline to 
 
135 See, eg, Kane v Ethell [2006] NZFLR 421.  
136 On the meaning of domicile, see Domicile Act 1976 (NZ). 
137 High Court Rules, r 6.29 and r 15.1; eg Kane v Ethell [2006] NZFLR 421. 
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make an order in respect of foreign movables if the respondent is neither domiciled nor 
resident in New Zealand.  
But neither of these mechanisms is a panacea. New Zealand may be the 
appropriate forum even though New Zealand law is not closely connected to the 
relationship (for example, where the couple recently moved to New Zealand, and New 
Zealand is the domicile of origin of only one of the parties). Ironically, the court may 
also treat the applicability of the PRA as a factor pointing towards New Zealand as the 
appropriate forum since the law applicable to the substance can be a strong factor in 
determining the appropriate forum. 138  Section 7(3), too, may be unavailable. The 
respondent may be domiciled or resident in New Zealand, in circumstances where 
another country is much more closely connected to the relationship; and the discretion 
is limited to foreign movables. The provision seems primarily concerned with the 
enforceability of orders over particular movables. 
The PRA itself does not provide any clues that would help to explain the breadth 
of section 7. On the one hand, it is only natural that a unilateral choice of law rule should 
be accompanied by broad connecting factors. A restrictive approach may leave ‘gaps’ 
in the applicable law and unduly impede a claimant’s access to justice. Section 7 avoids 
these risks by casting its net wide. In all other respects, it may simply be seen as a 
(unilateral) replication of the common law choice of law rules for movable and 
immovable property. 139  But this does not explain why New Zealand opted for a 
unilateral choice of law approach in the first place. For the reasons explored above, a 
multilateral choice of law rule provides a more principled solution. 
 
 
138 Wing Hung Printing Co Ltd v Saito Offshore Pty Ltd [2010] NZCA 502, [135]; Gilmore v Gilmore [1993] 
NZFLR 561 (HC), 566. 
139 See McLachlan (supra n 14) 71. 
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(2) Section 7 also excludes consideration of the movable property of non-domiciliaries, 
and of foreign immovables. If there is residual subject-matter jurisdiction in relation to 
such property at common law, the claim will likely be governed by foreign law,140 
leading to the possible fragmentation of claims across New Zealand and foreign law. If 
there is no residual subject-matter jurisdiction, the parties may be denied access to the 
New Zealand court altogether, or the claim may be fragmented across two or more 
jurisdictions. These exclusions hinder the effective dissolution of the personal property 
relationship. As has been argued above, the focus of the rules should be on the effective 
coordination – rather than the exclusion – of subject-matter jurisdiction.  
 
(3) Even section 7A(2), which allows for party choice and provides a counterpoint to 
the forum-centredness of section 7, is problematic, because it is unclear to what extent 
the parties’ choice must comply with any rules of formal validity.141 Section 7A(2)(b) 
contains the confusing requirement that the agreement ‘is in writing or is otherwise 
valid according to the law of that country’. It is also unclear why the section requires 
couples to have entered into the choice of law agreement ‘before or at the time of their 
[relationship]’.142 This provision significantly reduces the practical availability of party 
choice, especially to parties in de facto relationships.  
 
This inward focus of the existing rules may be the result of an overly categorical, closed 
approach to conflict of laws methodology. The principle of connection, when conceptualised 
as neutral and normatively self-sufficient, is easily displaced where claims raise questions of 
public policy.  In this closed approach, ‘close connection’ and ‘public policy’ form a bright-
 
140 A claim based on New Zealand law would likely be unavailable: see supra B3. 
141 Hook (supra n 128) ch 6, pt V.B.ii. 
142 See Law Commission (supra n 3) 793. 
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line binary. Hence, couples’ property – as an area of public policy – readily triggers blanket 
exclusions of foreign law and jurisdiction.143 But as we have now seen, modern conflict of laws 
methodology goes much beyond this binary, potentially hollow labelling that the discipline has 
at times been associated with:144 an empty principle of connection, on the one hand, and public 
policy on the other. In allocating claims to legal systems, the conflict of laws provides a 
framework for negotiating differences across borders – a framework for relating to, and dealing 
with, ‘the other’.145 Upon careful evaluation, it is appropriate in principle that New Zealand 
courts may assume international jurisdiction and apply foreign law to claims arising from 
personal property relationships, subject to a public policy exception for matters that go right to 
the heart of New Zealand’s most fundamental interests.   
 
V.   Conclusion   
This paper has argued on the basis of first principles that New Zealand’s conflict of laws rules 
for couples’ property should adopt an internationalist approach. The Law Commission’s 
inquiry into the PRA represents an exciting opportunity to refashion the rules accordingly. But 
the argument also raises interesting questions beyond the New Zealand context. In particular, 
it is possible that the proposed rules would be equally appropriate in other jurisdictions that 
have taken a forum-centred approach to couples’ property, like England and Australia.146 It is 
true that the substantive laws in these jurisdictions differ greatly from the PRA. But the analysis 
in D1 above suggests that a broad approach to characterisation, taking account of the functions 
of foreign laws, could still yield similar results. The proposed rules also raise questions for 
 
143 Cf, in relation to divorce, M Wolff, Private International Law (Clarendon Press, 2nd edn, 1950) 373-4.  
144 See, eg, H Muir Watt, ‘Private International Law Beyond the Schism’ (2011) 2 Transnational Legal Theory 
347, 375-81 for a critical account of private international law’s ‘tunnel-vision’.  
145 See Schiff Berman ‘Conflict of Laws and the Legal Negotiation of Difference’ (supra n 48); H Muir Watt, 
‘Hospitality, Tolerance, and Exclusion in Legal Form: Private International Law and the Politics of Difference’ 
(2017) 70 Current Legal Problems 111; Riles (supra n 51). 
146 Family matters that fall under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (and the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings 
Act 1984) (England and Wales) and the Family Law Act 1975 (Aust), respectively, are largely governed by the 
law of the forum. 
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jurisdictions that, unlike New Zealand, have adopted multilateral choice of law rules for 
couples’ property.147 These jurisdictions have avoided an open-ended, evaluative connecting 
factor like the one suggested in this paper and, based on the analysis in D3(c) above, may have 
placed too much emphasis on the predictability of fixed connecting factors. It seems that New 
Zealand now has a unique opportunity to demonstrate the benefits of an internationalist 








147 eg Swiss Code on Private International Law, Art 54. 
